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Abstract
We propose a Markov Switching Graphical Seemingly Unrelated Regression (MS-GSUR)
model to investigate time-varying systemic risk based on a range of multi-factor asset pric-
ing models. Methodologically, we develop a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) scheme
in which latent states are identified on the basis of a novel weighted eigenvector centrality
measure. An empirical application to the constituents of the S&P100 index shows that
cross-firm connectivity significantly increased over the period 1999-2003 and during the fi-
nancial crisis in 2008-2009. Finally, we provide evidence that firm-level centrality does not
correlate with market values and it is instead positively linked to realized financial losses.
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The financial crisis of 2008-2009 has shown that liquidity and valuation shocks may
quickly propagate across the economic system and affect financial institutions oper-
ating in different markets, with different size and business structure, thus causing
widespread losses and domino effects. Understanding the dynamics of cross-asset and
cross-equity linkages is therefore of key importance to both systemic risk management
purposes and to deal with contagion waves in times of crisis. Systemic risk shocks are
conventionally referred to in the network literature as abrupt increases in the density
of cross-firm connectivity (see, e.g. Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon 2012, and
references therein). Modeling firms’ connectedness through network analysis has been
recently supported by a series of papers that have shown its in- and out-of-sample
superior performance over traditional, correlation-based approaches.1
We extend the existing literature in a number of ways. First, we propose a system-
wide inferential scheme based on a Markov-switching graphical model that allows us
to simultaneously consider all the possible linkages among firms through constraints
on the regime-specific conditional dependence structure. Second, we propose an iden-
tification scheme for different regimes of cross-firm connectivity based on a novel
weighted eigenvector centrality measure, which is related to both the number and
the strength of the connections between firms. Third, we provide an asset pricing
application based on otherwise standard multi-factor pricing models in which the ex-
posures of the assets to the risk factors (their regression betas) are allowed to change
according to the regimes in cross-firm connectivity. This allows us to develop a uni-
fied framework where systematic and systemic risks are not mutually exclusive, in the
sense that firm-specific exposures to sources of systematic risk may directly depend
on the level of aggregate network connectivity.2 Finally, we provide a Metropolis-
1See, e.g., Forbes and Rigobon (2000), Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia
(2005), Corsetti, Pericoli, and Sbracia (2011), Billio et al. (2012), Barigozzi and Brownlees (2014),
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014),Timmermann, Blake, Tonks, and Rossi (2014), Brownlees, Nualart, and
Sun (2014), Diebold and Yilmaz (2015), and Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2015) among
others.
2In this paper, we define systemic risk as the risk caused by the possibility that a firm-specific
event may be severe enough to cause pervasive instability in the whole economic system; we define
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within-Gibbs sampling scheme which permits to jointly draw both the parameters of
the factor pricing model, the latent states and the underlying regime-specific graphs.
Methodologically, we build upon the Gaussian Graphical model for multi-variate
systems proposed byWhittaker (1990), Dawid and Lauritzen (1993), Lauritzen (1996),
Carvalho, West, et al. (2007), Wang and West (2009), Wang (2010), Rodriguez,
Lenkoski, and Dobra (2011), Wang, Reeson, and Carvalho (2011) and Ahelegbey,
Billio, and Casarin (2016). In particular, Wang et al. (2011) developed a dynamic
matrix-variate graphical model which allows to capture conditional dependencies un-
der time-invariant graphs. We generalize and extend their framework by introducing
Markov-switching dynamics in the graph structure within a Seemingly Unrelated Re-
gression (SUR) model. More specifically, we propose a new Markov Switching Graph-
ical SUR (MS-GSUR) which makes it possible to identify different regimes of network
connectivity. The regime-switching identification problem is solved by exploiting the
graph-theoretic properties of the state-specific conditional dependence structures of
the error terms in the model. Thus, we provide a new weighted eigenvector centrality
measure, which accounts not only for the number of adjacent nodes, but also for the
weights of the edges and for the number of indirect connections between nodes, i.e.
the number of walks between nodes. We formally show that our measure can be
related to both Bonacich (1972) and communicability (see, e.g., Estrada and Hatano
2008 and Estrada and Hatano 2009), as well as to other measures used in the analysis
of topological features of complex networks.
Our empirical application focuses on the cross-section of daily excess returns of
the constituents of the S&P100 index over the period 1996-2014. The emphasis on
stock returns is motivated by a widespread desire by policy makers and regulators to
incorporate the most current information for the purpose of systemic risk measure-
ment: stock prices of largely traded stocks reflect information more rapidly than other
non-traded measures such as accounting variables. Informative cross-firm connectiv-
ity is estimated on the basis of the residual covariance structure of stock returns,
instead systematic risk as the risk inherent in aggregate market and macroeconomic conditions
that cannot be simply diversified away. Moreover, we use the notions of network connectivity,
connectedness, and of systemic risk interchangeably.
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conditioning on a set of tradable risk factors used in some of the most popular linear
asset pricing models, namely the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the three-
factor model of Fama and French (1993), and Merton’s (1973) intertemporal CAPM
(I-CAPM). The results are robust across model specifications.
Our main findings reveal that the dynamics of systemic risk can be captured by
two regimes, in which a state of high connectedness characterizes the period 1999-2003
(marked by the passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act, the inflating and bursting of
the dot.com bubble, and the ensuing financial scandals) and subsequently, the great
financial crisis of 2008-2009. We show that a few financial institutions turned out to
heavily outweigh other firms in the network during these periods and that shocks to
the Financial sector turned out to be the most systemically important. Finally, both
a cross-sectional regression and rank-correlation analysis show that market capital-
ization does not significantly explain the relevance of a given firm within the network.
However, firms which are more relevant within the network are more likely to suffer
significant losses during periods of high systemic risk.
2 A Markov Switching Graphical SUR Model
Let yit be the stock returns of the ith firm in excess of the risk-free rate at time t, and
xit the mi-dimensional vector of systematic risk factors. In our baseline formulation,
each time series of returns is modeled as a dynamic multi-factor linear model
yit = z
′
itβi(st) + εit, t = 1, . . . , T, i = 1, . . . , n (1)
where the matrix zit = (1,x
′
it)
′ includes an intercept plus mi covariates, βi(st) =
(βi0(st), βi1(st), . . . , βimi(st))
′ is a (mi + 1)-vector of time-varying regression coeffi-
cients, and εit is an error term that can be identified with firm-specific idiosyncratic
risk when Cov(zit, εit) = 0. The multi-factor pricing model in (1) is fairly general
and represents a reduced-form approximation to a linear pricing kernel (see, e.g.,





tβ(st) + εt, t = 1, . . . , T (2)
where yt = (y1t, . . . , ynt)
′ is the dependent variable vector, Zt = diag {z1t, . . . , znt}
is the block-diagonal matrix of covariates, β(st)
′ = (β′1(st), . . . ,β
′
n(st)) is the time-
varying coefficient vector of dimension m = n +
∑n
i=1mi and εt = (ε1t, . . . , εnt)
′
is the vector that collects the error terms. We assume that the risk factors are
common across stocks and the error terms are independently and normally distributed
conditionally on the latent state st, t = 1, . . . , T , and have a full time-varying variance-
covariance matrix, i.e., εt
iid
∼ N (0,Σ(st)).
In our model, the time-varying network is identified by the inverse variance-
covariance matrix Ω(st) = Σ(st)
−1 of the SUR error terms and a set of zero-restrictions
implied by an underlying graph G(st) ∈ G, where G is the space of undirected graphs.
More precisely, we introduce a state-dependent graph defined by the ordered pair
of disjoint sets G(st) = (V,D(st)) where V is the set of n vertexes, or nodes, and
D(st) ⊂ V ×V defines the set of edges in the state st.
3 The nodes are state-invariant
and represent the firms within the economy and the edges define the presence of
interconnections among firms. If two nodes i, j ∈ V are adjacent in the graph,
i.e. {i, j} ∈ D(st), then there is an interconnection between two firms. A graph
G(st) = (V,D(st)) is complete if D(st) = V × V , i.e., it contains all possible edges,
that is, all firms are interconnected. Let us define the subgraph GA of G(st) gen-
erated by A ⊂ V as the graph with vertex set A and edge set KA ∩ D(st), with
KA = A × A. A decomposition of a graph G(st) is a partition of V into disjoint
nonempty sets (A,B, S) such that the graph generated by S is complete and sepa-
rates the graphs generated by A and B, that is, any sequence of edges from a vertex
in A to a vertex in B contains vertices in S. A sequential decomposition of a graph
G(st), such that at each iteration i the separator Si is minimal and the subsets Ai ⊂ V
and Bi ⊂ V are nonempty, generates the collection A(st) = {GA1 , . . . , GAm} of m
subgraphs that cannot be further decomposed, i.e., its prime components, and the
3See, e.g., Bollobás (1998, 2001) for an introduction to graph theory.
5
collection B(st) = {GB1 , . . . , GBm′} of m
′ subgraphs generated by the separators. In
this paper, we focus on decomposable graphs, where G(st) is said to be decomposable
either if it is complete or if all its prime components are complete (see, e.g., Dawid
and Lauritzen 1993 for further details).
We consider undirected graphs, in which all edges are unordered pairs of vertices.
When G(st) is an undirected graph, a Gaussian graphical model for the error terms
is defined by the assumption that εt is normally distributed with element pairs εit
and εjt, i 6= j which are conditionally independent given the other error terms and
the latent states, i.e.,
εit ⊥ εjt |εV \{i,j}, st ⇐⇒ ωij(st) = 0, ∀i 6= j (3)
with εV \{i,j} = {εlt; l ∈ V, l 6= i, j} and ωij(st) (i, j = 1, . . . , n) the (i, j)-th element
of the precision matrix Ω(st). Hence, Ω(st) ∈ M(G(st)) with M(G(st)) the set of all
positive-definite symmetric matrices with elements equal to zero for all {i, j} /∈ D(st).
The Gaussian nature of our framework might present limitations as it does not per-
mit to capture co-dependencies in higher moments. While a distinctive attention to
covariances and correlations is typical of a classical finance (e.g., of the mean-variance
paradigm) approach, clearly this overlooks other important aspects. However, given
our goal to use standard I-CAPM-style models to differentiate the notions of system-
atic risk from systemic risk, our choice seems a sensible one as a first step of analysis.
The time-variation in the parameters of the MS-GSUR model is driven by a latent
first-order Markov chain process st with time-homogeneous transition probabilities
Prob(st = j|st−1 = i) = πij, i, j = 1, . . . , K, for all t = 1, . . . , T . The choice of a
regime-dependent dynamics is motivated by its popularity in the finance literature
as it allows for an intuitive economic interpretation of different market phases (see,
e.g., Guidolin and Timmermann 2008). The Markov switching dynamics of the SUR







where I{k} (st) is an indicator function that takes a value of one when the state st
takes value k at time t, and zero otherwise, and βk is the vector of regime-specific
betas. We assume that for each state st = k there is a regime-specific covariance






The regime-dependent feature of the covariance structure allows us to address po-
tential heteroskedasticity biases that are typical of correlation-based measures, as
discussed in Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Also, the topological features of the state-
specific graph Gk play a crucial role in the estimation of the model since they allow
us to identify regimes of low vs. high systemic risk. The factor model specification in
(2)-(5) implies that systematic and systemic risks are not mutually exclusive. In par-
ticular, while the exposures to systematic risks, i.e., the betas, depend on the latent
state, the latter, as shown below, is directly identified from the network defined by
the residuals, which on their turn depend on the regression betas. In this respect, the
relationship between systematic and systemic risk captured by the model is contem-
poraneous and not causal, and posterior inference is interpretable only as a result of
an interplay between systematic and systemic risks, which provides evidence about
the most likely combination of systematic and systemic risk.
3 Inference on Networks and Parameters
Let Gk, k = 1, . . . , K be a sequence of decomposable graphs, Ak = {A1,k, . . . , AnA,k,k}
the set of nA,k complete prime components of Gk and Bk = {B1,k, . . . , BnB,k,k} the set
of nB,k separators ofGk. If the joint distribution of excess stock returns is Markov with
respect to a decomposable graph Gk, the joint density of yt given st = k factorizes as
















For each subgraph g ∈ Ak or g ∈ Bk, ygt = (yit : i ∈ g), Zgt is the corresponding
matrix of covariates, βgk = (βik : i ∈ g) the subset of factor loadings, and Σgk the
relative block of the covariance matrix of the residuals from Σk. Each term in (6)
has a multivariate normal distribution, yg ∼ N (Z
′
gβgk,Σgk), where Ωgk = Σ
−1
gk is a
full positive-definite symmetric matrix. Given the graph Gk, the joint distribution
(6) is completely defined by the component-specific marginal betas, covariates, and
covariance matrices (see, e.g., Giudici, Green, and PJ 1999 and Carvalho et al. 2007).
3.1 Prior Specification
Dawid and Lauritzen (1993) define a class of probability distributions for covariance
matrices on decomposable graphs called hyper-inverse Wishart. Conditional on the
graph Gk, the prior distribution of the k-th state covariance matrix Σk is the hyper-
inverse Wishart
Σk ∼ HIWGk (ck, Ck) , (7)
with ck and Ck the degrees of freedom and the location parameters, respectively.
We denote this prior distribution with p(Σk|Gk). For each state st = k, the hyper-
inverse Wishart represents the unique conjugate “local prior” for complete prime
components that are inverse Wishart distributed (see Carvalho, West, and Massam
2007 for a detailed discussion). By generating the tree representation of the prime
















, so that the density is given
by










where TAj,k = Card(Aj,k) is the cardinality of Aj,k, and CAj,k is the jth diagonal block
of Ck corresponding to ΣAj,k (see Hammersley and Clifford 1971 and Dempster 1972).
The initial sparse-inducing prior over the graph structure is defined as a Bernoulli
distribution with parameter ψ on each edge inclusion probability. That is, a n-node




ψdij,k (1− ψ)(1−dij,k) ∝ ψCard(Dk) (1− ψ)N−Card(Dk) (10)
where dij,k = 1 if {i, j} ∈ Dk for i 6= j, and 0 otherwise, and Card(Dk) =
∑
i,j∈V dij/2
denotes the cardinality of Dk, which is the number of edges (see Bollobás 1998,
Chapter 1). Given that the graph is undirected, the cardinality of Dk is given by
∑
i,j∈V dij/2, which is equal to N = n(n− 1)/2 if the n-node graph is complete, i.e.,
there is an edge between all pairs of nodes. The prior (10) has its peak atNψ providing
a flexible way to directly control for prior model complexity.4 To induce sparsity and
hence obtain a parsimonious representation of the interdependence structure implied
by a graph, we choose ψ = 2/(n−1) which provides a prior mode in correspondence to
n edges. In addition to this baseline specification, we experiment with two alternative
prior specifications for p (Gk) which imply either an empty graph, or a complete graph,
i.e., dij,k = 1 for i,j = 1, . . . , n, i 6= j. The posterior distribution of the set Gk tends
to reach a similar posterior median for different starting priors. The prior for the
factor betas is chosen to be independent of the covariance structure:
βk ∼ N (mk,Mk) (11)
We choose prior distributions for the regression parameters centered around zero to
be rather uninformative and common across states. The prior distribution for the
kth row of the transition matrix Π, i.e., πk = (πk1, . . . , πkK)
′ is a Dirichlet, i.e.,
πk ∼ Dir (ck1, . . . , ckK) (12)
4Alternatively, a uniform prior might have been used instead. However, as pointed out in Jones,
Carvalho, Dobra, Hans, Carter, and West (2005), a uniform prior over the space of all graphs is
biased towards a graph with half of the total number of possible edges.
9
with clk the concentration hyper-parameter.
3.2 Posterior Approximation
Let us denote with yτ :t = (yτ , . . . ,yt), τ ≤ t, the sequence of observations between τ
and t, with G = (G1, . . . , GK) and θ = (θ1, . . . ,θK) the collections of state-specific
graphs and parameters, respectively, where θk = (βk,Σk,πk), k = 1, . . . , K. The
complete likelihood is then defined as




p (yt|st,θ, G) p (st|st−1,θ) p (s0) (13)
With reference to our application, the marginal likelihood accommodates the exis-
tence of fat tails in the distribution of excess stock returns. Indeed, given the local
conjugate priors and the hyper-Markov structure of the graph Gk, one can show that
the marginal distribution conditional on the sequence of states is an hyper Student-t
(see, e.g., Dawid and Lauritzen 1993 for details).
Let p(θ, G) ∝
∏K
k=1 p(βk)p(Σk|Gk)p(Gk)p (πk) be the joint prior distribution; then
the joint posterior is p(θ, G|s1:T ,y1:T ) ∝ p (y1:T , s1:T |θ, G) p(θ, G). Because such dis-
tribution is not tractable, the estimator of the parameters and graphs cannot be
obtained in analytical form. We approximate the posterior distribution by imple-
menting a multi-move Gibbs sampling algorithm (see, e.g., Roberts and Sahu 1997
and Casella and Robert 2004), where the graph structure, the hidden states, and the
parameters are all sampled in blocks. At each iteration, the Gibbs sampler sequen-
tially cycles through the following steps:
1. sample s1:T given the graphs G, the parameters θ and the observations y1:T ;
2. sample Σk given s1:T , βk, Gk and y1:T , for k = 1, . . . , K,
3. sample Gk given Σk, s1:T and y1:T , for k = 1, . . . , K,
4. sample βk given s1:T , Σk, Gk and y1:T , for k = 1, . . . , K,
5. sample Π given s1:T .
We extract the latent states st, t = 1, . . . , T by using a forward-filtering backward-
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sampling (FFBS) algorithm (see Frühwirth-Schnatter 1994 and Carter and Kohn
1994). Because the latent state is discretely valued, the FFBS is applied in its Hamil-
ton (1994)’s form.
Denote with Tk = {t : st = k} the index set for observations in regime k and with
Tk = Card(Tk) its cardinality. Also, let etk = yt − Z
′
tβk be the residuals conditional







tk. Given the local conjugate prior in (7),
the posterior for Σk is
p (Σk|y1:T ,θ, s1:T ,βk) ∝ HIWGk (ck + Tk, Ck + E
∗
k) , (14)
see Appendix A for a proof. To sample the graphs Gk, k = 1, . . . , K, we compute
the unnormalized posterior over the graphs p(Gk|y1:T , s1:T ) ∝ p(y1:T |s1:T , Gk)p(Gk),
for any specified state k (see, e.g. Giudici et al. 1999 and Jones et al. 2005). As in
the proof of (14), given the prior independence assumption of the parameters across
regimes, one can show that
p (Gk|y1:T , s1:T ) ∝ p (Gk)
∫ ∫
p(yTk |sTk ,βk,Σk)p(βk)p(Σk|Gk)dβkdΣk (15)
where














To evaluate this integral, we follow Chib (1995) and Wang (2010) and approximate
the marginal likelihood via a local-move Metropolis-Hastings step based on the con-
ditional posterior p(Gk|y1:T , s1:T ). A candidate G
′
k is sampled from a proposal distri-
bution q(G
′






k|y1:T , s1:T )q(Gk|G
′
k)





where p(Gk|y1:T , s1:T ) has been defined in (15). The add/delete edge move proposal
is rather accurate, although such accuracy comes at the price of a substantial compu-
tational burden. The full conditional posterior distribution of the state-specific SUR
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coefficient βk is conjugate and defined as























, and Ωk = Σ
−1
k is the inverse covariance matrix
given the underlying graph structure, Gk. Finally, the conjugate Dirichlet prior for
the rows of the transition probability πk = (πk1, . . . , πkK)
′ is updated as follows
p(πk|s1:T ) ∝ Dir (ck1 +Nk1, . . . , ckK +NkK) (18)
where Nlk, k = 1, . . . , K, is the empirical distribution which counts the transition
between the lth and the kth latent discrete states, i.e., Nlk =
∑T
t=1 ξlk,t with ξlk,t =
I{k} (st) I{l} (st−1).
3.3 States Identification via Eigenvector Centrality
The likelihood function in (13) remains unchanged with respect to any state per-
mutation. Therefore, under an invariant prior specification, the posterior will also
be invariant to any state permutation (see Frühwirth-Schnatter 2006 for a review of
label-switching and identification issues). We propose a state-identifying restriction
based on a weighted eigenvector centrality measure. In its general form, the eigen-
vector centrality of the ith firm/stock, is a quantity proportional to the sum of the
centralities of the neighbors of a vertex, so that a vertex may display a high centrality
either by being connected to a lot of other vertexes or by being connected to other
vertexes that are themselves highly central.
As in many other fields (e.g., biology, neuroscience, and operations research),
where complex networks have been studied, it is possible to assign to each edge of
the graph a weight proportional to the intensity of the connections among the various
elements of the network. Appropriate metrics combining weighted and topological
observables have been discussed in the literature (see Rubinov and Sporns 2010 for
a review); as argued in Barrat, Barthlemy, Pastor-Satorras, and Vespignani (2004),
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network metrics based on weighted edges allow us to provide a better description of
the hierarchies and organizational principles at the basis of the architecture of the
networks. In the Gaussian graphical model literature, covariances, precisions, and
the topological features of the graph, such as the paths between pairs of nodes, see,
e.g., Jones and West (2005), have been routinely combined together with the goal of
assessing the centrality of each node.
In our financial application, the information about the existence of a financial
linkage between pairs of stocks is encoded in the presence or absence of an edge
between two nodes, while the strength of the linkage is measured by the covariance
between pairs of stocks. Thus, we construct a state-specific weighted graph defined




σij,k if (i, j) ∈ Dk
0 otherwise
(19)
that is the weight σ̃ij,k assigned to each pair of nodes {i, j} ∈ V × V is equal to the
corresponding covariance if they are connected in state k ∈ K. The relative centrality






where λk is some constant. With a small re-arrangement, this measure can be re-
written in a more compact form as the eigenvector equation Σ̃kγk = λkγk where γk =
(γ1,k, . . . , γn,k)
′. Since Σ̃k is real and symmetric, a unique solution is guaranteed to
exist by the Perron-Frobenius theorem.5 Our average weighted eigenvector centrality








5 See, e.g., Bollobás (1998), Chapter 8, Theorem 5, for a description of the relationship between
the maximal eigenvalue and the minimal and maximal degree of a graph.
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where γin,k is the i-th element of the eigenvector γn,k corresponding to the largest
eigenvalue λn,k. The advantage of (21) is that it accounts not only for the number
of connections of each node with the adjacent nodes, but also for its weight and for
the weights of the indirect connections with other nodes on the graph. The notion
of indirect connection between nodes is clarified by the following definitions of walks
and paths between nodes (see Bollobás 1998, Chapter. 1, for further details):
Definition 1. A walk p = (i0, e1, . . . , el, il), between two vertices i, j of Gk is identified
by an alternating sequence of (not necessary different) vertices V (p) = {i0, i1, . . . , il},
with i0 = i and il = j, and edges Dk(pi0il) = {e1, . . . , el} ⊂ Dk, with e1 = (i0, i1)
and el = {il−1, il}. The number of edges Card(Dk(pij)) = l in a walk is called “walk
length”. A walk of length l is called l-walk.
Definition 2. A path pij between vertices i, j of Gk is a walk with distinct ele-
ments in its vertex set. The shortest-path p∗ij between two vertices i, j is min
l
{p =
(i0, e1, . . . , el, il), l ≥ 1}, that is, the path with minimum length.
Proposition 1 provides an interpretation for our measure by showing that it can
be made arbitrarily close to a weighted sum over walks, where weights are inversely
related to the length of each walk.
Proposition 1. Let G̃k = (V,Dk, Σ̃k) be a weighted undirected graph with vertex
set V = {1, . . . , n}, edge set Dk and real-valued weight matrix Σ̃k. Denote with
λ1,k ≤ λ2,k ≤ . . . ≤ λn,k the eigenvalues of Σ̃k, with γj,k, j = 1, . . . , n the associated
eigenvectors, and with q(G̃k) be average eigenvector centrality. Assume the maximal
eigenvalue λn,k has multiplicity one, and define Iδ(1/λn,k) = {b : 0 < 1/λn,k− b < δ},




























is the sum of the walk weights over the set P
(l)
ij,k of all possible l-walks between vertices
i and j for a given state k = 1, . . . , K, where σ̃(p) =
∏l
r=1 σ̃ir−1ir,k is the weight







is a normalizing factor.
Proof See Appendix A.
Other centrality measures have been proposed in the literature, such as average
node degree, closeness, and betweenness. However, these measures may fail in iden-
tifying alternative regimes of systemic risk. Degree centrality gives a simple count
of the number of connections any given firm or asset maintains, without effectively
discriminating the relative importance of these connections with respect to the whole
network. However, linkages across firms are arguably not all alike. Analogously, close-
ness and betweenness are measures of centrality based on the shortest paths between
one node and all other nodes in the graph. These measures implicitly assume simplis-
tic and pre-determined paths and may be severely inappropriate for the analysis of
the transition mechanism of economic shocks which in general have feedback effects
and are unlikely to be restricted to follow specific paths. Our centrality measure ad-
dresses these issues and takes into account that an edge or the shortest path between
two nodes does not measure the full level of connectedness between two nodes.
In addition, our measure shares some features with the communicability measures
for complex networks proposed in Estrada and Hatano (2008, 2009) and more gener-
ally with other global connectivity measures (e.g., see Han, Escolano, Hancock, and
Wilson 2012, Qi, Fuller, Wu, Wu, and Zhang 2012, and Qi, Fuller, Luo, and Zhang
2015) by admitting decompositions in walks, spanning trees, and circuits. More
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specifically, the following decomposition holds:
Corollary 1. Let σ̃(p) =
∏l
r=1 σ̃ir−1ir ,k be the weight product over the edges of a walk
p = (i0, e1, . . . , el, il), and q(G̃k) the weighted eigenvector centrality measure of the
graph G̃k. Define Iδ(1/λn,k) = {b : 0 < 1/λn,k−b < δ}, δ > 0, the neighborhood of the









































where P ∗ij,k and l
∗
ij denote the set of the shortest paths between nodes i and j of the
graph G̃k and their length, respectively.
Proof See Appendix A.
The first term in (23) reflects the connectivity due to the shortest paths and de-
gree distribution, while the second term reflects the connectivity or influence between
nodes at a global level, reflecting losses spreading into the financial system forward
and backward several times from a source to a destination. Thus, the measure we
propose provides a better representation of more complex structures such as scale-free
or small-world networks. This aspect is also reflected by a different decomposition
of our measure into intra-cluster and inter-cluster communicability terms. The fol-
lowing decomposition shows that our measure also naturally accounts for community
structures (see Fortunato 2010 for a graph-theoretic definition of community).
Corollary 2. Let q(G̃k) be the weighted eigenvector centrality measure of the graph
G̃k. Define Iδ(1/λn,k) = {b : 0 < 1/λn,k − b < δ}, δ > 0, as the neighborhood of the





















































where (x)+ and (x)− are the positive and negative parts of x, respectively.
16
Proof See Appendix A.
Intuitively if the ith and jth entries of a eigenvector have the same sign, then
the corresponding nodes react in a similar way to a shock propagating through the
network (see, e.g. Estrada and Hatano 2008). Thus, the nodes can be partitioned into




i,k ) to the average
centrality. At this point, we have completely developed the apparatus necessary to
our state identification strategy based on network statistics. Regime identification is
based on the restriction
q(G̃1) < . . . < q(G̃K),
This constraint directly “separates” regimes according to the connectivity features of
the network, which allows us to give a clear economic interpretation to the regimes:
the first regime is associated with the lowest level of systemic risk and hence the lowest
average of centrality scores across firms, the second regime corresponds to the next
lowest average incidence of systemic risk, and so on, with the last regime associated
with the strongest incidence of systemic risk.
4 Empirical Analysis
Our application focuses on all the constituents stocks of the S&P100 index for which
we have at least fifteen years of continuous trading days as of the end of our sample,
leaving us with n = 83 firms. The sample period is May 1996 - October 2014. The
S&P 100 represents about 63% of the market capitalization of the S&P 500 and about
half of the total market capitalization of the U.S. equity markets as of January 2017.
These stocks tend to be the largest and most liquid companies in the U.S.
We analyze three popular linear asset pricing models starting from the plain vanilla
CAPM, then extended to the three-factor model proposed by Fama and French (1993)
to include both size and value factor-mimicking portfolios, to conclude with an imple-
mentation of Merton’s (1973) intertemporal CAPM in which the aggregate dividend
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yield, fixed income default and term spread are added to the excess returns on the
market portfolio as priced factors. The default spread is computed as the differ-
ence between the yields of long-term corporate Baa bonds and long-term government
bonds, and should reflect a risk premium for the aggregate risk of a firm’s default on
its debt. The term spread is measured as the difference between the yields on 10-
and 1-year government bonds, and reflects the slope of the risk-free yield curve, a
well-know business cycle leading indicator.6
4.1 Estimates of Latent States and Parameters
A priori, we assume that the latent states are persistent. This is based on the con-
ventional wisdom that systemic risk is not a quickly mean-reverting process (see, e.g.,
Forbes and Rigobon 2002, Billio et al. 2012 and Diebold and Yilmaz 2014). In our
application, we set the hyper-parameters to be rather uninformative: mk = 0 and
Mk = 1000In for each k = 1, . . . , K. The prior for the hyper-inverse Wishart dis-
tribution is also set to be fairly vague, i.e., ck = 3 and Ck = 0.0001In. Finally, the
marginal prior on the space of graphs is a Bernoulli distribution with ψ = 2/ (n− 1)
which provides a prior mode at n edges. To reduce sampling inefficiency we keep
one in five draws and discard the initial 20% of the draws as burn-in sample. In a
separate online Appendix we formally test for the number of regimes; the evidence
from Bayes factors is clearly in favor of a model specification with two regimes.
Figures 1 shows the filtered probabilities of being in a state of high systemic
risk across different linear factor specifications. The results indicate that the high
connectivity regime started around 1998 and has strongly characterized the period
2000-2001 (i.e., the dot.com bubble, the market panic that followed the September
2001 terror attacks, the Enron and Worldcom financial scandals, and the unfolding of
the events leading to the second Iraqi war), and the great financial crisis of 2008-2009.
6Data on corporate bonds and Treasuries are from the Fred II database at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St.Louis. Following Campbell (1996), the innovations from a recursively estimated first-
order Vector Auto-Regressive VAR(1) model are used as pricing factors in the Intertemporal CAPM
implementation. As in Petkova (2006), these innovations are orthogonalized with respect to the
excess return on the market portfolio and re-scaled such that they have the same variance.
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Model-Implied Systemic Risk Probability and NBER Recessions - Fama-French






























Model-Implied Systemic Risk Probability and NBER Recessions - I-CAPM
Figure 1. Filtered Probabilities of the High Systemic Risk Regime
The shaded areas represent the systemic risk filtered probabilities for a given model specification,
while the red line shows the NBER recession indicator from the period following the peak through
the trough. A value of 1 is a recessionary period, while a value of 0 is an expansionary period.
Although there is an obvious mis-match between the ex-post identification of the high
network connectivity regime and the NBER business cycle indicator over the period
1998-2002, the NBER recession and high systemic risk tend to overlap during the
recent financial crisis. As a whole, our filtered probabilities line up consistently with
well-known periods of increasing turmoil in financial markets.7


















Figure 2. Transition Probabilities of the Latent States for Different Models
The first (last) two columns represent the posterior probability of staying in a state of low (high)
systemic risk. The red line shows the posterior median estimates, the blue boxes mark horizontally
the 25th and 75th quantiles.
7In this paper we are focusing on the fragility of the economic system rather than on financial
crises per se. The fact that few events at the beginning of 2000 may have been reflected in a switch
to a regime of high network connectivity is highly possible even though these events have not always
triggered a full-blown financial crisis. Interestingly, we show below that also outside well known crisis
episodes, financial firms (and a few other sectors) always occupy a central position in the network
because of their high connectivity.
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Figure 2 shows standard confidence box plots for the posterior transition proba-
bilities of the latent systemic risk states across different model specifications. In both
factor specifications, the states of high systemic risk are rather persistent, with an
approximate median probability of πhh = 0.9. The persistence of the high systemic
risk regime is slightly lower than for the low systemic risk regime, which is compatible
with the empirical evidence that turbulent periods of crisis and contagion tend to be
less protracted than “normal” times.
































Betas on the Size Mimicking Portfolio





Betas on the Value Mimicking Portfolio
Figure 3. Changes in Betas Across Systemic Risk Regimes, Three-Factor Model
This figure shows the posterior of the between-state differences in the intercepts and regression betas.
The top left (right) panel shows the posterior of the changes in the conditional intercepts (betas on
the market portfolio). The bottom left and right panels report the changes in the betas for the size
and value mimicking portfolios, respectively. We cluster the ticks on the horizontal axis according
to an industry classification.
Figure 3 reports the box-plot of the posterior of the between-state differences, i.e.
low minus high, in the conditional intercepts and in the regression betas from the
Fama-French three-factor model. For ease of exposition and because they are similar
to the CAPM, the results for the I-CAPM are reported in an online Appendix. Notice
that, under the assumption of tradability of the factors, the conditional intercept
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measures the unexpected excess stock returns, i.e. Jensen’s alpha, while the betas
measure the regime-dependent exposure to systematic risks. For each stock, we show
the posterior distributions of the parameters as box plots and cluster these around
industry-specific ticks on the horizontal axis.
The top-left panel shows that the Jensen’s alphas tend to be higher when aggre-
gate network connectivity is low. As a matter of fact, the differences between the
regime-specific intercepts are predominantly positive, meaning that the inclusion of a
sizable systemic risk component significantly increases the accuracy of standard fac-
tor pricing models (see, e.g., Ahern 2015). Moreover, the posterior estimates of the
market betas (top-right panel) increase quite dramatically in regimes of high network
connectivity. This tends to be more visible for companies in the Financial industry
where the difference in the posterior mean of the market betas is as high as 0.3. A
similar increase in the exposure to market risk is also estimated for some stocks in
the Materials and Technology sectors. As far as the two remaining risk exposures
are concerned, the Financial sector turns out to be more exposed to the value risk
factor (bottom-right panel) when aggregate connectivity is high. The Industrial and
Materials sectors also show an increasing exposure to the value mimicking portfolio
in the high systemic risk regime.
4.2 Network Estimates
Under the MCMC estimation scheme outlined in Section 3, it is possible to define the
posterior distribution of the graph and covariances p(Σk, Gk|y1:T ) and to assess the







k be the jth of J posterior draws of, respectively, the state-dependent
graph, edge set and covariance matrix. As a result, it is possible to define the weight
matrix Σ̃
(j)





















We first report the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of the graphs. Figure 4
shows the results obtained for the Fama-French three-factor model. Financial firms
become increasingly pivotal to the network during periods of high systemic risk. This
is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the Financial sector is central to the
transmission mechanism of shocks during a crisis. Instead, firms within the Energy
sector show the highest degree of network centrality in regimes of low connectivity.
The role of energy firms is not entirely unexpected, given that historically, the US
economy has been exposed to quite a few energy or oil price shocks (see, e.g. Hamil-
ton 2009 and Kilian 2009).8 The results reported so far confirm that during periods
of market turmoil, the systemic importance of the Financial sector substantially in-
creases. Finally, the residual nature of the network identification strategy implicitly
confirms that the importance of each firm holds after conditioning on size and value
factors as sources of systematic risk. In other words, the key role of the Financial
(Energy) sector when systemic risk is high (low) is confirmed even when size and
value exposures are netted out.
We now shift our attention to the contribution of individual stocks/firms to ag-
gregate systemic risk. Figure 5 shows the top 20 stocks ranked according to the
posterior median of the weighted eigenvector centrality measure in (20). The left
panel reports the results obtained from the Fama-French three-factor model. In
a state of low aggregate network connectivity, energy stocks such as Exxon Mobil
(XOM) and Schlumberger (SLB), tend to carry the highest weight in the system.
Financials stocks rank in top positions when aggregate connectedness is high. For
instance, Bank of America (BAC) has double the effect of Exxon Mobil (XOM) and
almost four times the weight of Chevron (CVX) on system risk. The right panel
of Figure 5 extends these results to the I-CAPM model. First, by conditioning on
macroeconomic factors, the relative contribution of energy companies declines. Com-
panies such as Anadarko Ptl. (APC), ConocoPhillips (COP), Occidental Ptl. (OXY),
Apache (APA), and Schlumberger (SLB) show now a much lower centrality in the
8In an online Appendix we report the results for the I-CAPM implementation. The network
tends to be more sparse for the I-CAPM where more regressors are included. This is possibly due to
the residual nature of the estimated network. In this respect, by including a significant risk factor,



































































































































































(b) High Systemic Risk
Figure 4. Posterior Estimates of Network Connectivity, Three-Factor Model
This figures reports the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of the graphs. The left (right) panel
shows the structure of the network in the regime of low (high) cross-firm connectedness. The size
and the color of the nodes are proportional to their weighted eigenvector centrality estimated as
in (25). The darker (bigger) the color (size) of the node, the higher its contribution to aggregate
systemic risk.








































































































XOM INTC WFC WMTTGT
OXY BAC LLY ABT APA
CSCOUNP BA HON AXP
High Systemic Risk
Low Systemic Risk
Figure 5. Firm-Level Network Centrality
This figure ranks the top 20 stocks according to the posterior median of the weighted eigenvector
centrality measure in (20). The red (blue) line with circles (squares) shows firm-specific centrality
measures when aggregate network connectedness is low (high).
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posterior network. This suggests that traded factors in the three factor model are
not sufficient to capture the aggregate state of the economy, which in turn appears
to be inherently related to energy shocks. However, as in the Fama-French model,
the weight of financial institutions exceeds all other industries’ weights when systemic
risk is high.
In a separate online Appendix, we report the results generalized at the industry
level by taking the average over the posterior median over firm-specific weighted eigen-
vector centrality within each industry. We classify stocks in 11 sectors according to
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). The results confirm a substantial
concentration of the network around few firms that belong to either the Financial and
the Energy industries. The importance of the Utilities, Telecommunications, Health
Care, Consumer Staples, and Consumer Discretionary sectors is almost negligible in-
stead. Interestingly, the ranking of industries in terms of their systemic importance
is robust across factor model specifications. A possible explanation is based on the
dominance of the excess return on the market as priced risk factor, which is included
in all of our linear factor specifications. In this respect, while additional factors may
help to refine the analysis of the graph network, the key features of our empirical
analysis depend on the fact that a market portfolio is included in the set of risk
factors.
4.3 Market Value, Financial Losses and Network Centrality
The network centrality of a firm/industry is potentially linked to its relative market
value. For instance, the relative equity weight of the Financial sector has dropped
from 20% in 2006 to less than 10% by the end of the financial crisis of 2008-2009,
when network connectivity has been high (see Figure 1). This may imply the ex-
istence of an inverse relationship between network centrality of the Financial sector
and its market value. The opposite is true for the Energy sector: the relative market
value of the Energy sector has increased throughout our sample and has tended to
be higher during periods of high aggregate systemic risk. The same positive relation-
ship applies, although to a weaker extent, to the Telecommunication industry, while
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listed companies belonging to Industrial and Materials sectors do not display a clear
mapping between valuations and systemic risk.
Because these empirical findings are rather stark, we proceed to test for the ex-
istence of a significant relationship between firm-level network centrality and market
values across regimes. We do so by estimating a set of univariate cross-sectional
regressions in which the explained and explanatory variables are the centrality mea-
sures for each firm and their average market value, respectively. We estimate these
regressions for each factor pricing model and for each identified regime of network
connectivity. We control for industry heterogeneity by including regime-specific in-
dustry fixed effects. Together with the cross-sectional regressions we compute the
rank-correlation coefficient ρ as in Kendall (1938), which measures the correspon-
dence between the ranking of the stocks based on their posterior centrality and their
average market value in each regime. Table 1 reports the results.
Table 1. Network Centrality and Market Values
CAPM Fama-French I-CAPM
Coeff t-stat R2 ρ Coeff t-stat R2 ρ Coeff t-stat R2 ρ
High 0.021 1.201 0.012 0.054 0.011 1.291 0.021 0.061 0.021 1.254 0.013 0.045
Low 0.035 1.581 0.029 0.084 0.052 1.271 0.013 0.085 0.039 1.432 0.024 0.055
This table reports the regression estimates and the rank-correlation coefficient as in Kendall (1938).
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals using a
Newey-West HAC correction. Rank correlations ρ are highlighted in grey when the null hypothesis
is rejected in tests with a size of 5% or lower.
We find evidence that systemic risk and market value are not precisely correlated.
The slope coefficient is low in magnitude and statistically insignificant across regimes.
The t-statistics are below the 5% significance level, and the adjusted R2 is below 3%
across models and regimes. One may argue that this finding does not square well with
other evidence in the empirical finance literature. Indeed, the empirical evidence tends
to find a positive association between the contribution to systemic risk and market
capitalization especially for the banking and insurance sectors.
Although it is evident that the largest institutions caused major systemic effects
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, there have been other, earlier crises triggered by
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smaller companies and sectors, e.g., dotcom crisis, which nonetheless increased the
overall fragility of the economic system. In this respect, our paper is more about the
estimation of systemic weakness through time-varying network connectivity rather
than financial crises per se. Also, it should be clear that our goal here is not to
over-throw a result from the empirical finance literature, but to deal with a potential
concern that our empirical analysis may just represent a convoluted way to deal with
firm and/or sector size and market values. Our results in Table 1 show that this
is not the case: there is only weak correlation between market values and network
centrality, although such correlation is indeed positive.
One additional feature that we expect from systemic risk measures is the ability to
accurately explain the potential losses experienced by firms. To this end, we test the
null hypothesis that firms more exposed to systemic risk are those that tend to record
higher losses after major downturns. For each model specification, we regress the
average maximum percentage financial loss on firm-specific centrality.9 As above, we
control for industry heterogeneity by including regime-specific industry fixed effects.
The results are reported in Table 2.
Table 2. Network Centrality and Realized Financial Losses
CAPM Fama-French I-CAPM
Coeff t-stat R2 ρ Coeff t-stat R2 ρ Coeff t-stat R2 ρ
High 0.751 2.261 0.121 0.211 0.871 2.314 0.101 0.205 0.340 2.181 0.112 0.198
Low 0.412 1.901 0.145 0.181 0.301 1.913 0.062 0.171 0.456 1.859 0.061 0.169
This table reports the regression estimates and the rank-correlation coefficient as in Kendall (1938).
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals using a
Newey-West HAC correction. Rank correlations ρ are highlighted in grey when the null hypothesis
is rejected in tests with a size of 5% or lower.
We find that companies more exposed to the overall systemic risk more likely
suffer significant losses when aggregate systemic risk is high. The cross-sectional
regression coefficient is indeed significant at standard size levels and the adjusted R2 is
9The maximum percentage loss for a firm is defined to be the maximum difference between the
market capitalization of an institution between time t and t+h dividend by its market capitalization
at time t. Such an average measure is computed by averaging out the maximum percentage loss for
a given regime k of systemic risk.
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around 12% across models, which means that firms that are more contemporaneously
interconnected with the rest of the market are also those that experience major losses
in periods of high systemic risk. In this respect, our centrality measure is similar to
the marginal expected shortfall measure originally proposed by Acharya, Pedersen,
Phillippon, and Richardson (2017), which tracks the sensitivity of returns of stock i to
a system-wide extreme event, thereby providing a market-based measure of fragility
exposure of a firm. However, such positive correlation between network centrality
and market losses is less significant when aggregate connectedness decreases, i.e., in
states of low systemic risk.
For each regime, Table 2 also reports the Kendall’s rank-correlation coefficients ρ
between the ranking of firms according to centrality and losses. The results confirm
that there is a significant relationship between network centrality and value losses
across firms, especially during periods of high aggregate systemic risk. This is consis-
tent with previous evidence in Billio et al. (2012) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), the
theoretical framework of Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012),
and the conventional wisdom that firms more exposed to systemic risks are bound to
face larger losses on average.
5 Conclusions
In the aftermath of the great financial crisis, one of the main questions for economists
and market participants has concerned the extent to which the economy is robust
to unexpected shocks. In the language of network analysis, this translates into a
desire to understand the nature and patterns of cross-firm connectivity. We address
this question by developing a novel Markov Switching Graphical Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (MS-GSUR) model, which allows us to jointly estimate standard SUR-type
relationships of firms’ asset price connectedness from the error terms of a range of
popular linear multi-factor pricing model specifications. By conditioning on different
sources of systematic risk, we implicitly recognize that systematic and systemic risk
might be conditionally independent but not mutually exclusive.
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Methodologically, we develop a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) scheme
which allows to sample the posterior estimates of all parameters and measures of in-
terest. The label-switching identification problem is solved using the graph-theoretic
properties of the state-specific conditional dependence structure of the regression
residuals. In this respect, we propose a new weighted eigenvector centrality measure,
which accounts not only for the number of adjacent nodes, but also for the weights of
the edges and for the number of indirect connections between nodes. More generally,
our new measure implies that the existence of a financial linkage between firms is
encoded in the presence or absence of an edge, while the strength of the linkage is
measured by their corresponding covariance terms.
In the empirical analysis we show that the dynamics of systemic risk for the
constituents of the S&P100 index over the period 1996-2014 can be captured by two
regimes, in which a state of high connectedness characterizes the period 1999-2003
and the great financial crisis of 2008-2009. In addition, we show that a few financial
institutions heavily outweighed other firms in the network during these periods and
that shocks to the Financial sector turned out to be the most systemically important.
Finally, both cross-sectional regressions and a rank-correlation analysis show that,
while market capitalization does not significantly explain centrality, those firms more
exposed to the overall systemic risk more likely suffer significant losses when aggregate
systemic risk is high.
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A Proofs of the results of Section 3
A.1 Proof of the result in 14
The complete likelihood of the data is then defined as





























with ξlk,t = I{k} (st) I{l} (st−1). Thus the full conditional of Σk given y1:T , θ, s1:T , is





































where Tk = {t : st = k}, et = yt − Z
′
tβ(st) and etk = yt − Z
′
tβk. Exploiting the conditional
independence structure encoded in k-th state graph Gk it follows






































































∝ HIWGk (ck + Tk, Ck + E
∗
k) ,
where E∗Aj,k is the block of E
∗
k corresponding to ΣAj,k , TBj,k = Card(Bj,k) and ΣBj,k is defined over
the set of separators as (9).
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 is composed of two parts. First we show that our weighted eigenvector
centrality measure is the limit of the rescaled Bonacich’s c(b) centrality (see Bonacich 2007) of the
weighted graph G̃k of regime k ∈ K. In the second part, we show that the Bonacich’s c(b) centrality
can be written as a weighted sum over all walks between all pairs of nodes of the graph G̃k. Let σ̃ij,k






σ̃ij,kγj , i = 1, . . . , n
which can be re-written in a more compact format as the eigenvector equation Σ̃kγ = λγ with n
solutions given by the eigenvalues λi,k, i = 1, . . . , n with λ1,k ≤ . . . ≤ λn,k, and the associated
eigenvectors γik = (γ1i,k, . . . , γni,k)







k holds with Λk = diag{λ1,k, . . . , λn,k} and γk = (γ1k, . . . ,γnk), with γi,k i = 1, . . . , n being
the orthonormal eigenvectors, γij,k the ith element of the jth eigenvector for the state−k weighted
covariance Σ̃k.






























































ϕi(b, k)γi,k, where ϕi(b, k) =
bλi,k
1− bλi,k
Define Iδ(1/λn,k) = {b : 0 < 1/λn,k − b < δ}, δ > 0 as a neighborhood of the inverse maximal
eigenvalue λn,k. Then ∀ε > 0, ∃δj > 0 such that for ∀b ∈ Iδj (1/λn,k), |ϕj(b, k)/κ(b, k)| < ε/n,
j 6= n and ∃δn > 0 such that for ∀b ∈ Iδn(1/λn,k), |ϕn(b, k)/κ(b, k) − 1| < ε/n, where κ(b, k) =
(
∑n










































where ‖x‖2 denotes the L
2-norm of x. To conclude the first part of the proof we need to find the




















































































As for the second part of the proof, we can use Definitions 1 and 2 in the main text and rewrite part









which can be further re-written as a function of the sum of the weights over all possible walks

























































Let air−1ir,k be the (ir−1, ir)-th element of the adjacency matrix Ak associated with Gk and P
(l)
ij,k =
{(Dk(p), Vk(p)); Vk(p) = {i0, . . . , il} ⊂ Vk, Dk(p) = {e1, . . . , el} ⊂ E, i0 = i, il = j} be the set of all

























r=1 σ̃ir−1ir,k is the path weight. By plugging (A.37) in (A.34) and substituting the
result in (A.31) we obtain (22) in the text.
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A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
























as b tends to 1/λn,k from below. Then, since it is possible to obtain a path from a walk by removing
its sub-cycles we can define for each pair of nodes i and j the set of paths P ∗ij,k between i and j with
minimum length l∗ij (shortest paths) and the set P
(l)
ij,k of all remaining walks between the two nodes
with length l > l∗ij . Since P
(l)
ij,k = ∅ for all l < l









































which gives the desired decomposition.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 2
The limit of our weighted eigenvector centrality measure q(G̃k), as b tends to 1/λn,k from below,















Let us denote with γ+i,k the n-dimensional vector with j-th element γ
+
ji,k = (γji,k)
+, j = 1, . . . , n
and with γ−i,k the n-dimensional vector with j-th element γ
+
ji,k = (γji,k)
+, j = 1, . . . , n, where (x)+
and (x)− denote the positive and negative part of x, respectively and γji,k the j-th element of γi,k.


































which yields the decomposition for q(G̃k) given in Eq. (24) with ϕ
(1)
i,k = (ι
′γ+i,k)
2 + (ι′γ−i,k)
2 =
(
∑n
j (γji,k)
+)2 + (
∑n
j (γji,k)
−)2 and ϕ
(2)
i,k = ι
′γ+i,kι
′γ−i,k = (
∑n
j (γji,k)
+)(
∑n
j (γji,k)
−).
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